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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARK 0. HAROLDSEN, INC., d/b/a
MARKO ENTERPRISES, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

]
]
]I

Case No. 870468

]
i (Priority Classification 14b

vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION, an agency
of the State of Utah,

]
]

Defendant-Respondent. '
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
MARK 0. HAROLDSEN, INC.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the taxpayer's lease or purchase of mailing

lists contained on magnetic computer tape or^ preprinted labels
constitute a use of "tangible personal property" within the
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3 (repealed; superseded by
Section 59-12-103(l)(k) and (1) (1987))?
2.

Was the taxpayer's payment to the owners of the

mailing lists a payment primarily for services and for
intangible information rather than for the lease or purchase of
"tangible personal property"?
3.

Is Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc., entitled to a refund

of taxes paid in connection with the use of the mailing lists
obtained from the magnetic tapes and printed lists?

4.

Is Utah Code Ann. 59-16-3 ambiguous in its

provisions regarding taxation of "tangible personal property"
and should the ambiguity be resolved in favor of the taxpayer?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from the dismissal with prejudice of
plaintifffs Complaint against the Utah State Tax Commission as
ordered by the lower court in its Order Disposing of Reciprocal
Motions for Summary Judgments and Affirming Decision of Utah
State Tax Commission, entered on November 12, 1987.

(R.

120-25.)
B.

Disposition of the Case Below.

Plaintiff-appellant Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc., (the
"taxpayer" or the "Company") commenced this action by filing a
Complaint and Appeal to Tax Division on May 28, 1985, appealing
from an adverse ruling of the Utah State Tax Commission (the
"Tax Commission").

(R. 2-6.)

Defendant State Tax Commission

filed an Answer on June 28, 1985.

(R. 19-22.)

The parties

stipulated as to all of the evidence in this case.

The lower

court entered an order on the stipulation on September 10,
1985.

(R. 23-25.)

Each of the parties filed a motion for

summary judgment, which were argued at a hearing on April 14,
1987.

In a Memorandum Decision dated May 12, 1987, the court

denied the taxpayer's motion for summary judgment and granted

the Tax Commission's.

(R. 103-10.)

The court subsequently

entered its Order Disposing of Reciprocal Motions for Summary
Judgment and Affirming Decision of Utah State Tax Commission,
on November 12, 1987, dismissing the case with prejudice.
120-25.)

(R.

On December 2, 1987, the taxpayer liled a Notice of

Appeal.

(R. 126.)
C,

Statement of Facts.

The taxpayer Mark 0. Haroldsen, I n c , is a company
engaged in the business of marketing real estate information.
It publishes books and tapes on real estate investment, and
conducts real estate seminars.

(Tr. 8-9.)

As a marketing

technique, the taxpayer engages in direct mail advertising.

It

mails to prospective customers circulars and advertisements
relating to its products, and invitations relating to its
seminars.

(Tr. 9.)

The Company obtains names and addresses

for these mailings from mailing list brokers, either through
leasing or purchasing the lists.

During th^ period at issue,

July 1, 1979, through June 30, 1982, the Conjpany paid a total
of $154,844.10 to list brokers.

(Tr. 14.)

The issue in this

The references to the transcript &re to the
transcript of the formal hearing before the Utah State Tax
Commission on February 20, 1985, which is included in the
record on appeal. By the lower Court's order of September 10,
1985, the transcript constitutes part of the stipulated facts
in this case. (R. 23-25.) The facts set fofth in the Statement
of Facts are not in dispute.

case is whether the purchase of lists through the list brokers
during the period in question constituted a use of "tangible
personal propertyff within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §
59-16-3.
The taxpayer most frequently used the services of
Dependable Lists, a mailing list broker, during the period at
issue, from whom the taxpayer purchased approximately 92
percent of its lists.

The taxpayer used Dependable Lists

because of the excellent service it provided.

(Tr. 15, 26.)

In purchasing or leasing a mailing list, the taxpayer would
typically contact a broker, such as Dependable Lists.

The

taxpayer would describe the particular product that it wanted
to market and would often send a sample of the product to the
broker for evaluation.

Once the broker had examined the

product to be marketed, it would suggest a number of lists for
the taxpayer's review.

After consultation with the broker, the

taxpayer would choose from the broker's set of suggested
lists.

(Tr. 29, 33-34, 41-42.)
Having selected a particular mailing list or lists,

the taxpayer would then consult with the broker to refine the
lists chosen.

In the process of refining lists, the taxpayer

relied heavily on the expertise of the broker.

It was not

unusual for the broker and the taxpayer to spend a great deal
of time identifying the demographic characteristics of people

most likely interested in the product to be marketed.

Lists

were refined by choosing the characteristics, or "selects," of
the group of persons on the list to which the taxpayer desired
to offer its products.

(Tr. 29-31, 33-34, 40-43.)

The

categories, or "selects," requested by the company included
sex, geographic locale, income bracket, home ownership, number
of children, ages of children, subscribership to certain
periodicals, the kinds of books purchased through the mail, and
the types of prior investments.

The taxpayer, in consultation

with the list broker, would choose the appropriate selects, and
the broker would refine the list on these criteria.

Every list

that the taxpayer used was refined in this fashion.

(Tr. 30,

51.)
Having determined which selects to iise, the broker
then uses a computer program to refine the list.

The

difficulty of the programming varies, depending on how
complicated the selects are.

(Tr. 94-95.)

The primary

expertise of the broker is more in determining which selects to
i

use rather than in the refining of the list through the
computer program.

(Tr. 95.)

Where the taxpayer purchased the

use of more than one list for the same marketing campaign, the
I

lists would be run through a computer to delete name
duplicates, a process called "merge-purge."

(Tr. 44-46.)

The services of a list broker are critical to the
taxpayer's direct mail campaigns.

Payments to brokers are far

more for services than for access to "raw," or unrefined, lists
of names.

"Raw" lists are not profitable in direct mailing.

During the period at issue the taxpayer bought no "raw" lists.
Each list purchased was substantially refined through the use
of selects.

The success or failure of a direct mail marketing

campaign depends on the services of the broker in selecting
proper lists and in refining the lists with proper selects.
The cost of lists varies to reflect the amount of services
rendered by the list broker, and the value of the information
on the list.

(Tr. 32, 41, 52-57, 62, 94-95.)

Having refined the chosen list through the use of
selects, the taxpayer would then place an order for the use of
the list through the list broker.

The taxpayer would send a

sample of the "mailing piece" to the list broker who would, in
turn, submit it to the list owner for approval.

(Tr. 43).

Once the mailing piece is approved, the list is processed and
delivered to the taxpayer, which would then be allowed a
limited, one-time license to use the mailing list.

List owners

seed the mailing list with coded "control" names in order to
detect unauthorized use of the mailing list.
47.)

(Tr. 12-13, 43,

The information rented by the taxpayer from the list
owner is transferred to the taxpayer on computer tape or on
preprinted labels.

During the period in issu^, the taxpayer

received 63.4 percent of its lists on labels, and 36.6 percent
on computer tapes.

Once the limited, one-time use of the tape

has been made, the tape must be returned, erased, or
destroyed.

In situations when the tape may be kept, a separate

fee is charged for the tape.

(Tr. 11-14, 44, 46-47.)

Following the formal hearing before the Tax
Commission, the Commission found that the mailing lists were
tangible personal property and upheld the challenged use tax
assessment.

The taxpayer paid the contested amount of

$7,750.00, and commenced this action seeking a judgment that
the assessment was erroneous and ordering a refund of that
amount to the taxpayer.

The tax division of the Third District

Court for Salt Lake County also held that th£ lists were
tangible personal property.

It is from that determination that

the taxpayer appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Because the lower court decided the case on

stipulated facts, this Court should consider the matter on a de
novo basis.
2.

The taxpayer purchased or leased mailing list

information through out-of-state list brokeifs.

The information

was transferred through the medium of either magnetic tape or
printed lists.

The magnetic tapes and printed lists used by

the taxpayer were incidental to the sale of services performed
by the list brokers in preparing and refining the lists for the
purposes of the taxpayer's marketing program.
3.

The magnetic tapes and printed lists used by the

taxpayer were incidental to the purchase of intangible
information.

Every court that has considered the issue has

held that mailing lists contained on magnetic tape are not
taxable as tangible personal property.

Computer software is

analogous, which is also generally not held to be tangible
personal property subject to a sales or use tax.
4.

Any ambiguities in the taxing statute, Section

59-16-3, must be strictly construed and resolved in favor of
the taxpayer.

If the legislature intends that the state should

tax the transfer of information by magnetic tape, or other
similar means, it should specifically so provide by statute.
The statute in question should not be given a forced
interpretation to accommodate computer-age transfers of
information which could be transferred by other means than
magnetic tape or printed lists.

ARGUMENT

I.
BECAUSE THE FACTS WERE STIPULATED TO BY THE PARTIES
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE MATTER DE NOVO.
The parties stipulated that the evidence adduced and
stipulated to at the formal hearing before the State Tax
Commission on February 20, 1985, including the transcript of
hearing and all exhibits introduced at the hearing, constituted
a full and complete record of all facts relevant to the subject
matter of the action.

On September 10, 1985> the lower court

entered an order on the stipulation.

(R. 23f25).

Because the

facts are not in dispute, but have been stipulated to, this
Court should review the issues raised in this appeal de novo.
The Court previously held in Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v.
Great Northern Baseball Company, 748 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1987)
that when a trial court relies on stipulated facts to decide a
case,

f,

this court does not apply the clearly erroneous

standard, but will sustain the lower court's decision only if
convinced of its correctness. . . . Thus, we examine the facts
de novo."

Id. at 1060.
II.
THE MAGNETIC TAPES AND PRINTEt) LISTS
USED BY THE TAXPAYER WERE INCIDENTAL TO
A SALE OF INTANGIBLE SERVICES.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(a)(Supp. 1986) imposes a tax
on "storage, use, or other consumption in this state of

-9-

tangible personal property."

For a transaction to be taxable

under Section 59-16-3, two separate and independent elements
must be present:

(1) There must be a use of property, and (2)

the property used must be tangible.

Except for specific

services as outlined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(b), there is
no tax on the use of services.

By its terms, the statute

subjects only tangible personal property to taxation.

The use

of intangible property is not taxable.
Not all transactions involving a use of property come
within the terms of the statute.

Property is often transferred

incidentally in a sale of services.

Tangible property is often

transferred incidentally to a sale of services.

The transfer

of tangible property is often incidental to a sale of
intangible property.

Courts have recognized that transactions

often mix taxable and non-taxable elements.

Thus, in

determining the taxability of such transactions under sales and
use taxes, courts generally attempt to determine the "true or
real object of the sale."

For example, the "true object" test

was applied in the case of Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating
Corporation, 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1977).

There the issue was

whether the transfer of compiled statistical data on computer
cards constituted the sale of tangible personal property.
Holding in the negative, the court stated that "the true object

-10-

of this transaction is not the data processing card as
contended by the Comptroller, but the purchase of coded or
processed data, an intangible."
original).

Id-

at

168 (femphasis in

See Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Division of

Taxation, 182 N.J. Super. 179, 440 A.2d 104, 117-18 (1981);
Fingerhut Products Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d
606 (Minn. 1977).
This Court used a version of the "real object test" to
determine the taxability of such "mixed" transactions in Thorne
and Wilson, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, b81 P.2d 1237
(Utah 1984).

There, the Court upheld a district court's ruling

that a sale of rare United States and foreign coins was a sale
of tangible property.

The Court noted that

[i]t is the

substance of the transaction and not the property actually
transferred that controls. . . .

In order to determine whether

the metal tokens were sold as tangible personal property, the
essence of the transaction must be examined/1

Id. at 1238

(emphasis added) (quoting Michigan National ftank v. Department
of Treasury, 127 Mich. App. 646, 339 N.W.2d 515, 517 (1983)).
Thus, in determining the taxability of the cjase at issue, the
"true object" or "essence of the transaction" of the sale must
be determined.
As noted above, there is no tax on [services under Utah
Code Ann. § 59-16-3 (a).

In this case, the Cjompany paid for the

-11-

services of the mailing list broker.

The evidence presented at

the hearing before the Tax Commission demonstrated that the
real object of the transaction was the purchase of the services
of the list broker.

Thomas Tolman testified that "the actual

money paid, from our point of view, to the broker, is far more
for the broker's services and what he is able to give us than
it is for the actual tape and paper."

(Tr. 54). All the lists

rented by the company were selected and refined with the
assistance of the list broker and its computer programmer, and
were tailored to the company's needs.
94-95).

(Tr. 32, 41, 52-57, 62,

The taxpayer relied on the list broker in selecting

lists, and in pinpointing possible customers from each list.
(Tr. 29, 43). A "raw" list has little, if any, value to the
company.

(Tr. 32, 94).
Essentially, the list brokers used by the Company

engaged in the service of gathering and collating demographic
and marketing research and providing it to the Company to
assist the Company's sales efforts.

The lists purchased by the

Company were not "canned" or "raw," but were specifically
tailored to fit the individual needs of the Company.

Courts in

situations similar to the present case have found that tangible
property transferred or used in a manner incidental to the sale
of services did not involve a taxable use of tangible personal

-12-

property.

For instance, in Williams & Lee Scouting Service,

Inc. v. Calvert, 452 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), the
taxpayer provided the service of gathering information
pertaining to oil and gas fields and then selling reports
containing the information.

The court held that the company

provided a service and that the sale of the written reports was
not a transfer of tangible personal property!.

The court noted

that the reporting of the information purchased by the taxpayer
"can take any form from handwritten notes, telephone, or
telegraph communications to printed material.
its communication is unimportant.

The method of

The value lies in the

intangible facts secured by the service." id. at 792.
In Maccabees Mutual Life Insurance Company v. State,
Department of Treasury, 122 Mich. App. 666, 332 N.W.2d 561
(1983), the court considered whether a sale of computer
software was a taxable transfer of tangible personal property
under a statute virtually identical to Utah's.

Observing that

the software programs "represent a personalized service,
customized to fit plaintiffs' particular computer
configuration," the court held that the sale of the software
was not taxable.

Id. at 563-64.

The Maccabees court cited

University Microfilms v. Scio Township, 76 Mich. App. 616, 257
N.W.2d 265 (1977), which considered whether master negative

I

microfilm copies of printed materials, rard books, periodicals,

-13-

and other sources were personal property.

The University

Microfilms court distinguished the plaintiff's microfilms from
computer software:
We agree with plaintiff that its master
negatives are similar to abstracts and computer
'software' in that all contain information, but
we disagree that that is what controls the
determination of intangibility. The value of an
abstract is personal, that is, it is dependent
ton the work of the one who controls the
information. If it is left to go out of date or
is inaccurate rate, it loses its value. . . .
Similarly, the value of computer "software" is
not in the card or disc itself, but rather in
the synthesization, compilation, organization
and creation of the computer programs contained
therein. . . . The value is personal. Payment
is made for the service and the expert knowledge.
275 N.W.2d at 267 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

See

Detroit Automobile Interinsurance Exchange v. Department of
Treasury, 361 N.W.2d 373, 374-75 (Mich. App. 1985) (court held
that sale of computer software was not taxable since the tapes
and disks were not tangible personal property, but represented
a service distinguished from TV games, albums, and cassette
tapes); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. City of New York, 276 N.Y.
198, 11 N.E.2d 728, 731 (1938) (court held that credit report
prepared by taxpayer involved a service and was not a use of
tangible personal property).
The list brokers in the present case gather and
categorize demographic marketing information which is of great
value to the Company in its sales efforts.

The brokers

unquestionably provide a service for which the taxpayer should
not be taxed.

The one-time use of the lists by the taxpayer

was not a taxable event.

The tangibility of the physical

magnetic tape was purely incidental to the real object of the
transaction:

the use of information resulting from the expert

services of the list brokers with whom the taxpayer dealt.
III.
THE TAXPAYER PURCHASED INTANGIBLE
INFORMATION, NOT TANGIBLE PROPERTY.
A.

The weight of authority recognizes that mailing lists
are not tangible personal property and use thereof is
not a taxable transaction.
I
The magnetic tapes and labels used by the taxpayer

were not purchased for their tangible worth as tapes and
labels, but rather for their value as a method of transmitting
information.

Every case that has considered the question

raised by the present case had held that the use of mailing

I
lists contained on magnetic tape is not taxable as tangible
personal property.

In Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director,

Division of Taxation, 182 N.J.Super. 179, 440 A.2d 104 (1981),
the court held that mailing lists transferred by magnetic tape
were not tangible personal property. The court stated:
Plaintiff is not subject to sales or use
tax when it leases mailing lists. The
leasing of computer information is not the
leasing or sale of tangible personal
property and is not taxable under dur act.
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Plaintiff is leasing information. It is
not leasing tangible personal property.
The tapes which are tangible personal
property and which transmit the information
are only incidental to the underlying
transaction between the parties. . . .
The tapes are an inconsequential part of
the transaction whose real object is the
obtaining of mailing list information.
. . . Under such circumstances the form of
delivery of the information should not
control its taxability. The inconsequential
aspect of the magnetic tapes in the subject
transactions may be compared to the
inconsequential aspect of the paper used in
connection with an accountant's services by
way of reports or with an attorney's
services by way of wills, other legal
documents or letters giving advice.
Id.

at 117-18 (citations omitted).
In Fingerhut Products Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue,

258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977), the court reached an identical
result in a case involving printed mailing lists.

Observing

that software on computer cards and tapes is analogous to the
typed mailing lists at issue, the court held:
Like the transfer of computer programs
through the use of punch cards, the use of
the tangible medium of typed mailing lists
is merely incidental to the use of the
incorporeal information contained in those
lists. The typed lists themselves were not
used within the contemplation of the
statute; what was used was the information
contained in the lists. Such use, in our
opinion, is not taxable under the current
statute.
Id. at 610.

In Mertz v. State Tax Commission, 89 A.D.2d 396, 456
N.Y.S.2d 501 (1982), the court held that mailing lists recorded
on magnetic computer tape were "merely the me4ium by which the
information that was the essence of the transaction was
transmitted.ff

Id. at 503.

The court accordingly held that

there was no sale of tangible personal property.

Id.

I

The same result is required in the ptesent case, which
involves nearly identical facts to Spencer Gifts, Fingerhut,
and Mertz, the only difference being that the brokers in the
present case also provide demographic research services for the
Company in connection with categorizing the lists that are
transferred.
Although the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the
mailing lists were not "raw" or "canned" lists, but were
refined by the broker through the use of selects, the same
result should obtain even if the Company purchased only "raw"
lists.

Moreover, even though the same list n^ay be sold by a

broker to more than one purchaser, it does not mean that the
broker performed any less of a service, or that the information
somehow becomes tangible personal property.

In First National

Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 54$ (Tex.Civ.App.
1979), the court rejected the state's argument that certain
computer software contained on magnetic tape should be taxed
because they were "canned" standard items sold to numerous
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customers.

Holding that the sale of the software was not

taxable, the court disagreed that the distinction between
canned and customized programs was valid.

"The test in each

case," stated the court, "is not whether the product is
'customized' or 'canned,' but whether the object of the sale is
tangible personal property."

lid. at 550.

The court in First National Bank of Springfield v.
Dept. of Revenue, 85 111. 2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981), also
declined to hold that the sale of "canned" computer programs on
magnetic tape was a taxable event.

The court refused to "draw

such an artificial distinction" between custom and prewritten
software.

Id. at 178.

Other courts have similarly held that

informational reports or mailing lists were not tangible
personal property in spite of the apparent "canned" nature of
the information.

See Washington Times-Herald v. District of

Columbia, 213 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (comic strip mats sold
by syndicate to newspaper); Fingerhut Products Co. v.
Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977) (typed
mailing lists); Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Division of
Taxation, 182 N.J. Super. 179, 440 A.2d 104 (1981) (mailing
lists on magnetic tape); Mertz v. State Tax Commissioner, 89
A.D. 396, 456 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1982)(mailing lists on magnetic
tape); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. City of New York, 276 N.Y.
198, 11 N.E.2d 728 (1937) (credit reports); Williams & Lee
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Scouting Service, 452 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. A£p. 1970)(oil and
gas scouting reports).
B.

Computer software is analogous to majLling lists and
is treated as an intangible by the majority of
courts.
The courts in Spencer Gifts and Fingerhut each

analogized mailing list information to computer software.

The

analogy is helpful in considering whether thei transfer of a
mailing list is of tangible personal property.

Courts that
have so ruled with respect to computer software 2 have
emphasized the following factors, each of whi[ch is equally
applicable to the present question regarding(mailing lists:
1.

Tapes and cards are incidental to the

transfer of information.

The "real object" ^r "essence" of

transactions involving magnetic tape or cards is the transfer
of information.

Once the information has been conveyed from a

2
The great majority of cases that have addressed the
question of the tangibility of computer software have held that
software is not taxable as tangible personal property. See
Honeywell Information Systems v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz.
171, 575 P.2d 801, 803 (1977) ("There is little doubt that
computer software is intangible property. . . . [Ejvery
jurisdiction which has considered the issue agrees"); James v.
TRES Computer Systems, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347, 348 (Mo. 1982)
(en banc) (most courts that have addressed tihe issue have ruled
that the intangibility of data and programs is not lost because
of their presence on tapes). See also Note, "Software and
Sales Taxes: the Illusory Intangible," 63 B.U.L. Rev. 181,
186 (1983) ("Every court that has addressed the issue of
tangibility has held that software is intangible").

tape to a computer the tape is discarded, erased, or returned.
This is exactly what the Company does in the present case when
it is finished with a tape.

As with many software

transactions, the Company is required by its contracts with the
brokers not to make more than a one-time use of the tapes it
receives.

(Tr. 13-14, 47.)

Once the information is taken from

the magnetic tape and put into the computer, the information is
treated as totally separate from the tape.
cannot be used again, but the tapes can.

The information

As Mr. Tolman

testified at the hearing before the Tax Commission, "I mean, we
can't use the information on the mag tape again or we could get
ourselves in a lot of trouble, but we can use the mag tape
itself for other computer purposes." (Tr. 47, 12). The
distinction between the magnetic tape and the information
encoded on it is emphasized by the fact that the taxpayer is
charged separately for the tape.

Most of what the taxpayer

pays to the list brokers is for the services rendered and the
resultant information.

The brokers charge a $15 to $25 fee for

the tape itself, separate and apart from the mailing list
information. (Tr. 47.)
Courts have emphasized in the software cases that the
magnetic tapes and punched cards are only the media through
which the transfer of information is accomplished.

In Commerce

Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976), the court

held that the software at issue was not tangible personal
property, even though it was sold on magnetic! tape:
When the information is transferred from the
tape to the computer, the tape is no longer
of any value to the user; and it is not
retained in the possession of the u^er. The
information on the tape, unlike the phonograph record, is not complete and ready to
be used at the time of its purchase. It
must be translated into a language Understood
by the computer. Once this information has
been translated and introduced into the
computer and the tapes returned or the punch
cards destroyed, what actually remains in
the computer is intangible knowledge; this
is what was purchased, not the magnetic
tapes or the punch cards. . . . Transfer of
tangible personal property under these
circumstances is merely incidental jt^T~the
purchase of the intangible knowledge and
information stored on the tapes.
Id. at 497 (emphasis added).

See District of Columbia v.

Universal Computer Associates, Inc., 465 F.2ld 615, 617 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (punched cards of insignificant value compared with
the information stored on the cards); State v. Central Computer
Services, Inc. , 349 So.2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. ][977) (held that
the commingling of intangible information with tangible tapes
and cards was incidental); First National BJnk of Springfield
v. Dept. of Revenue, 85 111.2d 84, 421 N.E.^d 175, 179 (1981)
(held that the magnetic tapes were not the $ubject of the
transaction, but the information); University Microfilms v.
Scio Township, 76 Mich. App. 616, 257 N.W.2d 265, 267 (1977)
("the value of computer 'softwear' [sic] is not in the card or

disc itself, but rather in the synthesization, compilation,
organization and creation of the computer programs contained
therein"); James v. TRES Computer Service, Inc., 642 S.W.2d
347, 349 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (held that the tapes were only a
medium to convey the data and were incidental to the transfer
of intangible information).
2.
alternate means.

The information can be transferred by
The fact that the information on the

magnetic tapes and printed lists may be transferred by other
means lends support to the conclusion that the essence of the
transaction involves an intangible.

To the Company the

important thing is the receipt of the information.

The

magnetic tapes and printed lists merely facilitate the
conveyance of that information.

The court in Spencer Gifts,

Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 182 N.J.Super. 179,
440 A.2d 104 (1981), observed that the magnetic tapes were an
"inconsequential part of the transaction."

The court found

support for its holding in the fact that "it is possible to
dispense with the delivery of tapes altogether and to transmit
the mailing list information by telephone from one computer to
another."

Id. at 118.

"Under such circumstances," concluded

the court, "the form of delivery of the information should not
control its taxability."

Id. Similarly, in Fingerhut Products

Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977),

the court stated that the mailing lists there at issue "could
have been transmitted orally by telephone, or someone could
have contacted the broker and manually copied) the information
from the broker's lists/1

Id. at 609.

Courts have uniformly adopted this rationale in
holding that sales of software and computer djata are not
taxable transactions.

See James v. TRES Computer Service,

Inc. , 642 S.W.2d at 349 (the information beiiig bought need not
have been put on tape, but could have been f^d directly into
the computer through electronic communications); Commerce
Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d at 406-07, 408 (the same
information on the tape could have been transmitted by
telephone lines or fed directly into the computer); First
National Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548, 550
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (the information on the tapes could have
been programmed by telephone or by hand); Bqllock v.
Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex. 1977)
(the information on the cards could have be^n ''transformed into
several forms").
C.

Mailing lists are not analogous to phonograph
records, books, or films.
The Tax Commission argued below th^it the taxation of

phonograph records, books, and films is analogous to the
present situation involving magnetic tape and printed pages.

The analogy breaks down, however, when one considers that the
real object of a purchase of record, book, or film is the
ownership of the particular item.

The magnetic tapes and

printed pages used by the Company are used merely to transfer
information after which their value is minimal.

Once the

information is transferred from the tape to the computer, the
tape may be used over, for other purposes, while the
information may only be used once.

The information and the

tape, at that point, are entirely separate and distinct. (Tr.
12, 47.)
Courts have uniformly drawn a distinction between
records, books, and films, on the one hand, and magnetic tapes
or other media whose purpose is merely to convey information,
on the other hand.

The tapes and lists at issue in the present

case are treated in fact as only a means of conveying the list
of names.

They are subordinate to the intangible information

which is the object of the sale.
analogous.

Records and books are not

Consumers are not given the limited kind of rights

in the use of the book that plaintiff is given in the mailing
lists.

No separate fee is stated for the paper or plastic used

to make the book or record.

The contents of a book or record

never become separate and distinct from the paper or plastic.
The court in First National Bank of Springfield v.
Dept. of Revenue, 85 111.2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981),

addressed a similar argument that computer software ought to be
taxed similarly to phonograph records and boojcs.

The court

rejected the contention, stating:
The tapes were certainly not the only medium
through which the information could be
transferred. In this way, the tapes differ
from a movie film, a phonograph record or a
book, whereby the media used are the only
practicable ways of preserving those
articles. Thus, while those articles and
the tapes are similar in that they
physically represent the transfer of ideas
or artistic processes, a more significant
distinction is that those articles ire
inseparable from the ideas or processes,
whereas computer programs are separable from
the tapes.
Id. at 178.
In Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, £38 S.W.2d 405
(Tenn. 1976), the court rejected the same argument in holding
that the taxpayer's purchase of magnetic tapfes and punch cards
was not taxable.

The court considered whether ot was a

finished product that was created and sold, as opposed to
information.

Id. at 407.

The court observed that the

purchase of a magnetic computer tape, which (could only be used
once, was unlike the purchase of a phonograph record:
One who buys a phonograph record intends to
obtain possession of a tangible it$m. Granted
the sound which emanates from the yecord when it
is played is the object of the purchase; but the
purchaser has no other viable method of bringing
the music of, say, Caruso into his living room.

The phonograph record remains in the possession
of the purchaser after its purchase, both during
periods of use and non-use.
The instant case presents a different
situation. A magnetic tape is only one method
whereby information may be transmitted from the
originator to the computer of the user. That
same information may be transmitted from the
originator to the user by way of telephone lines
or it may be fed into the user's computer
directly by the originator of the program.
When the information is transferred from the
tape to the computer, the tape is no longer of
any value to the user; and it is not retained in
the possession of the user. The information on
the tape, unlike the phonograph record, is not
complete and ready to be used at the time of its
purchase. It must be translated into a language
understood by the computer. Once this
information has been translated and introduced
into the computer and the tapes returned or the
punch cards destroyed, what actually remains in
the computer is intangible knowledge; this is
what was purchased not the magnetic tapes or the
punch cards. . . . Transfer of tangible personal
property under these circumstances is merely
incidental to the purchase of the intangible
knowledge and information stored on the tapes.
Id. at 408 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
Other courts have similarly distinguished
information-bearing tapes, cards, and lists from phonograph
records, books, and films.

See District of Columbia v.

Universal Computer Associates, Inc., 465 F.2d 615, 618 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (distinguishes computer cards, tapes, and discs from
films); State v. Central Computer Services, Inc., 349 So.2d
1160, 1162 (Ala. 1977) (distinguishes tapes and cards from

movie films; the right to publish or broadcast the motion
picture is "physically inseparable from the m<>vie film
itself1'); James v. TRES Computer Service, Incj. 642 S.W.2d 347,
350 (Mo. 1982) (distinguishes magnetic tapes from films and
records; the "physical presence of the movie film is essential
to broadcasting the intangible artistic efforts of the
actors"); First National Bank of Fort Worth v[. Bullock, 584
S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) ("Unlike a phonograph
record or filmstrip, when the information on the tape, in the
present case, is transferred to the computei ,j the tape is no
longer of any value or importance to the use^").
The Company urges the Court to adopt the same
rationale as in these analogous cases involving computer
3
software and hold that the mailing list information used by
the Company was intangible and not subject t<t> taxation.
D.

The use of tapes and printed lists is not a use
of "tangible personal property" und^r the Utah
statute,

3
The Internal Revenue Service has characterized
software as intangible, although in a different context than
personal property taxation. Rev. Proc. 69-211 § 4, 1969-2 C.B.
303. Several academic commentators have aisle\o urged the position that computer software is an intangible and should not be
subject to personal property taxation. See heinzman, "Computer
Software: Should it be Treated as Tangible Property for Ad
Valorem Tax?" 37 J. of Taxation 184 (Sept. 1972); Bryant &
Mather, "Property Taxation of Computer Software," 18 N.Y.L.F.
61 (1972); Note, "The Revolt Against the Prdperty Tax on
Software: An Unnecessary Conflict Growing Qut of Unbundling,"
9 Suff. L. Rev. 118 (1974).

The Tax Commission may argue that Utah Code Ann. §
59-16-3 is broader in scope than the statutes of other states
that have held that mailing lists are not "tangible personal
property."

The Tax Commission, by regulation, has defined

tangible personal property as follows:
Tangible personal property embraces all goods,
wares, merchandise, produce, and commodities, all
tangible or corporeal things and substances which
are dealt in or capable of being possessed or
exchanged. It does not include real estate or
any interest therein or improvements thereon nor
does it include bank accounts, stocks, bonds,
mortgages, notes and other evidence of debt,
insurance certificates or policies, personal or
governmental licenses. The term does not include
water in pipes, conduits, ditches or reservoirs
but does include water in bottles, tanks or other
containers. Tangible personal property includes
all other physically existing articles or things
including property severed from real estate. A
sales or use tax is imposed on the sale of
tangible personal property.
4
Utah State Tax Commission Reg. A12-02-526.

^Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13)(a) (1987) now
defines "tangible personal property" as meaning:
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce,
and commodities;
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and
substances which are dealt in or capable of being
possessed or exchanged;
(iii) water in bottles, tanks, or other
containers; and
(iv) all other physically existing articles
or things, including property severed from real
estate.

Although Tax Commission Regulation AJ|Z-UZ-!>2b does not
specifically limit the definition of tangible property to
objects that can be perceived with the senses, the word
"tangible" is itself limiting.

This Court ha? stated that "the

terms of a statute are used advisedly and should are given an
interpretation and application which is in actord with their
usually accepted meanings."

Board of Education v. Salt Lake

County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983).

The usually accepted

meaning of the word "tangible" according to Websters Third New
International Dictionary (1976) is "capable of being touched:
able to be perceived as materially existent ^sp. by the sense
of touch."

This definition is supported by t}he regulation,
i

which indicates that tangible personal property embraces "all
goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and commodities, all
tangible or corporeal things and substances vfrhich are dealt in
or capable of being possessed or exchanged."

In the context of

this definition, the mailing list informatioi(i used by the
Company clearly falls outside the definitional parameters of
the statute, which evidences a clear legislative intent to tax
only personal property that can be touched

rt

^ otherwise

perceived by the sense.
E.
The mailing lists were treated as intangibles
by the parties and are generally so treated in
business contexts.
In the context of competitive torts "customer lists"
have been recognized as trade secrets, which} are a form of

intangible property.

The lists in the present case have the

same characteristics of intangibility and were treated as trade
secrets by the parties.

"Written customer lists generally have

been regarded as trade secrets when the nature of the industry
permits the list to be kept secret and the list cannot readily
be duplicated by independent means."

Developments in The Law

-- Competitive Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 955 (1964).

In

Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 696
(Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that a trade
secret is "a type of intellectual property5 in effect> a
property right in discovered knowledge.ft

(Emphasis added).

See Leo Silfen, Inc., v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, 278 N.E.2d
636, 328 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1972) (court held that customer lists
may be protected as trade secrets where the customers are not
known in the trade, and are discoverable only by extraordinary
efforts); Abbott Laboratories v. Norse Chemical Corp. 33 Wis.
2d 445, 147 N.W. 2d 529, 538 (1967) (court held that customer
lists may be protected as trade secrets where the list is
secret and not readily duplicated by independent means);
Olschewski v. Hudson, 262 P. 43 (Cal. App. 1927) (court held
that "a list of laundry customers is a property right which may
be appropriately protected, but it is not a tangible right"
(Emphas is added)).

In the present case both the Company and the list
brokers treated the mailing lists as if they ^ere intangible
property.

First, the seller restricted the taxpayer's use of

the information sold, but was not concerned ^bout reuse of the
physical object sold, namely the magnetic ta^e, once the
information was erased.

(Tr. 12-13, 47.)

Second, the value of

the tangible means of exchange was slight in comparison to the
value of the list, and was separately stated and charged on the
bill to the taxpayer.

(Tr. 47, 49.)

Third

obtain the information by alternate means.

it was possible to
The Company

specified, as a matter of convenience, the method by which it
preferred to receive the lists of names.
Since the mailing lists are generally recognized as
intangible property in legal and business contexts generally,
they ought to be treated consistently by thej taxing authority.
See Fingerhut, 258 N.W.2d at 609.
IV.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-16-3 MU^T BE
STRICTLY CONSTRUED AND AMBIGUITIES
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER.
The essential difficulty in this c^se is that section
59-16-3 simply was not designed for the computer age.

Notions

of tangibility, while perhaps once useful ixi determining what
should be taxed, are outmoded in the context of transfers of
information by magnetic computer tape.

Utal[i Code Ann. §

59-16-3, at best, is ambiguous and, being so, should be
resolved in favor of the taxpayer.

The rule in Utah, as in

other jurisdictions, is that "statutes imposing taxes and
prescribing tax procedures should generally be construed
favorably to the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing
authority."

Builders Components Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 22

Utah 2d 172, 450 P.2d 97, 99 (1969).

See also Continental

Telephone Company of Utah v. State Tax Commission, 539 P.2d
447, 450 (Utah 1975).
The court in Spencer Gifts, in considering the
ambiguities of the statute under which it was urged that
mailing lists ought to be taxed as tangible personal property,
held that the statute must be resolved in favor of the
taxpayer.

440 A.2d at 120.

The opinion considered the

difficulty in resolving the questions of tangibility at issue:
It is not sensible to apply concepts such as
tangible and intangible, applicable to a very
different world, to the computer world. Even the
distinction between property and services is not
helpful here where definitions appropriate to the
subject matter of the tax are needed. Significant tax burdens should not be predicated on
largely irrelevant concepts developed in
different times for different purposes.
Id. (emphasis added).

Other courts have similarly ruled

The court stated in conclusion that ff[i]t doesn't
make sense to predicate significant consequences on the outcome
of debates regarding largely irrelevant concepts developed in
different times for different purposes." 440 A.2d at 104
(quoting Wessel, Freedom's Edge, "Controlling the Computer,"
126 (1974)).

that tax statutes must be resolved in favor of taxpayers where
the issues involved transfers of information (by magnetic tapes
or cards, such as software.

See First National Bank of

Springfield v. Dept. of Revenue, 85 111.2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175,
177 (1981); First National Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584
S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Jamesville Data Center,
Inc., 84 Wis. 2d 341, 267 N.W.2d 656, 658 (1^78).
The pertinent Utah statute should similarly be
resolved against the taxing authority and inj favor of the
Company.
CONCLUSION
Because the taxpayer purchased information resulting
from a service rendered by mailing list brokers, which was
separate and distinct from the tape and the labels by which the
information was communicated, this Court should hold that the
purchases by the taxpayer during the period Jat issue were not
taxable and that the taxpayer is entitled tp a refund of
$7,750.00.

Any ambiguities in the statute should be resolved

in favor of the taxpayer.
ADDENDUM
The taxpayer has appended to this brief copies of the
following documents:
1.

Lower court's Memorandum Decision dated Mav 12.

1987 (R. 103-10).

2.

Lower court's Order Disposing of Reciprocal

Motions for Summary Judgment and Affirming Decision of Utah
State Tax Commission. (R. 120-25.)
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Before the court are reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment
wherein
State
The

this

Tax

court

is

Commission

matter

came

asked

regarding

before

argument of the issues.
parties

submitted

positions.
the Utah

to

the

review
the

a decision

assessment

court

on

a

of

of

the

"use

special

Utah

taxes.11

setting

for

Prior to the hearing on the matter, both

Memoranda

in

support

of

their

respective

The court has also received the complete record from

State Tax Commission

which has l^een marked

as

Court's

Exhibit One and made a part of the court's official file.

After

hearing

under

argument

of

advisement

to

respective

parties

counsel,

further
and

consider
to

Utah State Tax Commission.
not in dispute.
this

matter

and

the

court

the

further

took

the

authorities

examine

the

matter
cited

record

by

the

from

the

The material facts in this case are

The court has now had an opportunity to consider
being

otherwise

fully

advised,

enters

the

following Memorandum Decision.
The plaintiff has appealed from a decision of the Utah State

OOO^GC

HAROLDSON V. TAX COMMISSION

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Tax Commission which assessed use taxes against the value of
mailing lists used in the course of his business.

The issue to

be resolved is whether the sales of these lists, in the form of
printed sheets and computer tapes, are subject to sales and use
taxes as tangible personal property.

The plaintiff argues that

the transactions involved the sale of services, and that any
transfer of tangible personal property was incidental to the sale
of intangible property.
that

any

services

The Tax Commission takes the position

provided

tangible personal property.

were

incidental

to

the

sale of

It is the opijnion of the court that

these lists are tangible personal property, and that their sale
or use is subject to taxation.
Both

parties

have

moved

for

summary

judgment,

undisputed facts, briefly stated, are as follows.

and the

The plaintiff

is a Utah corporation engaged in the marketing of real estate
information.

As a marketing technique, the plaintiff purchases

mailing lists from mailing list brokers to use in direct mail
advertising.

These lists are generated by the brokers based on

the target market specified by the plaintiff.

Such factors as

age, sex, income level, family status, and investment history are
used

to

define

those

plaintiff's advertising.

individuals

selected

to

receive

the

The completed lists are delivered to

the plaintiff for a one-time usage,1 and ttyey are contained in
x

Mailing lists are commonly "salted" With names of employees
of the broker to detect unauthorized use or the list.
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The printed sheets are

converted into mailing labels by a machine that cuts the names
from the sheet and gums them, and the computer tapes are read by
word processing equipment that prints the labels.

Approximately

thirty-five percent of the lists purchased) by the plaintiff were
on computer tape, and sixty-five percent yere on printed sheets.
Of the $154,844.10 paid by the plaintiff fd>r these lists, the Tax
Commission

assessed

interest and penalty.

a use tax deficiency of $19,711.21, plus
The plaintiff has paid about $15,000, and

approximately $7,750 remains in dispute.
This inquiry focuses on the language of the Use Tax Act of
1937, Utah Code Ann.

§ 59-16-1, et seq. (1953).

The scope of

the use tax is defined in § 59-16-3(a) (Subp. 1986), which states
that an excise tax shall be levied upon the "storage, use, or
other consumption of tangible personal prpperty . . . ." Tangible
personal property is defined in the Utah Sales and Tax Book of
Regulations as "all tangible or corporeal things . . . capable of
being possessed or exchanged."

Tax Reg. A12-02-S26.

Although

this definition provides little assistance, it is clear that
tangible personal property does not include such intangibles as
services.
The
property

line of demarcation between tangible and intangible
is

not

always

clear.

Courts

grappling

with this

question have examined the "real object" sought by the buyer to
determine whether the buyer's object was to obtain an act by an
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individual chosen for his skill, or whether it was the buyer's
object to obtain a product not dependent on the skills of the
individual providing it.

Accountant's Computer Serv. v. Koysdar,

298 N.E.2d 519, 527, 35 Ohio St.2d 120 (1973).

If the true

object of the contract is the service per se, the transaction is
not subject to tax even though some tangible personal property is
transferred incidental to the transaction.
The problem is that many transactions involve an inseparable
combination

of

services

and

tangible

personal

property.

Accountant' s involved three cases that we^re disposed of in the
following manner:
1.

A data processing firm was supplied by the taxpayer

with raw data.

The firm transcribed in onto punch cards, and the

cards were sorted, classified and arranged.

The cards were then

delivered to the taxpayer.

This transaction was found to be a

taxable

accompanied

sale of a product

personal service.
2.

by an

inconsequential

Id. at 527-28.

The additional service of data analysis transformed the

transaction to a nontaxable service transaction.

The delivery of

printed matter in the form of a report wa^ determined to be the
inconsequential element of the transaction.
3.

Id. at 528.

A market research company compiled statistical data and

analyzed it for presentation to clients.

Again the court found a

service transaction that was exempt from taxation, stating "it
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was the intellectual and manual personal Efforts . . . that was
sought . . . not the inconsequential tangible personal property
which was transferred,

for purposes of communication,

incidental element without a separate charge."
Other

jurisdictions,

including

Utah,

reasoning in different factual contexts,

as an

Id. at 520.

have

applied

this

yhorne and Wilson, Inc.

v. Utah State Tax Commission, 681 P.2d 3J237, 1238 (Utah 1984)
("it

is the substance of the transaction and not the property

actually transferred that controls.11);
State Tax Commission. 716 P2. 1318

Olft West Realty v. Idaho
(Idaho 1986)

(transfer of

multiple listing books from listing service to real estate broker
was a taxable transaction) .

In the present case it seems clear

that the generation of the lists for the taxpayer involved little
expertise, marketing skill or analysis on the part of the broker.
Although the plaintiff did consult the mailing list broker to a
limited extent, the purpose was to define the parameters of the
desired list, and this was done primarily ^y the plaintiff.

The

court finds that this service was incidental to the generation of
the lists, which were the real object of tlfie transaction.

There

still remains the question of whether thejse sales involved the
transfer of tangible or intangible personal property.
Regarding the printed sheets, it is clear that a sale of
tangible

personal

property

has

occurred4

These

lists were

processed by a machine that converted them to gummed labels, and
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they were affixed to the taxpayer's mailings.
the use of these lists was proper.

The tax imposed on

Fincrerhut Products Co. v.

Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606

(Minn. 1977) sale of

mailing lists in the form of gummed labels constituted taxable
sale of tangible personal property) ; Matter of Alan Drev Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 67 A.D.2d 1055, 41p N.Y.S.2d 516 (1979)
(same)•
Turning
difficult

to

the

question

transfer

of

the

is presented.

computer

Courts have

tapes

a more

distinguished

gummed mailing labels from computer tape$ in refusing to find
computer tapes tangible personal property.

Mertz v. State Tax

Commission. 89 A.D.2d 396, 456 N.Y.S.2d 501, 503 (1982)

("the

tapes . . . were merely the medium by which the information that
was the essence of the transaction was transmitted."); Spencer
Giftsf Inc. v. Taxation Div. Director, 18|2 N.J. Super 179, 440
A.2d

104,

information
property

117

(N.J.

Tax

1981)

("The

leasing

of

computer

is not the leasing or sale of tangible personal

and

is not taxable.");

Fincreyhut Products Co. v.

Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606, ^1° (Minn. 1977) ("the
use of the tangible medium of typed mailing lists is merely
incidental to the use of the incorporeal information contained in
those lists.").
It is the opinion of this court that these prior cases have
made

a

distinction

Whether the

where

information

there

is no practical

is supplied

on gummed

difference.

labels, typed
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lists, or computer tape, an item of tangible personal property is
transferred,

and

the

transaction

is taxable.

Although the

information contained by the tapes is incorporeal, it cannot be
possessed without some item of tangible perjsonal property, and it
is of no value to the user until it is transformed
tangible

mailing

label.

It

is

not

dimply

the

into a

intangible

information that the taxpayer seeks, but the list in the form of
mailing labels.
information

it

The value of the media is determined by the
contains,

and

in

this

respect

the

sale

of

information on a computer tape is no different from the sale of
the same information contained in a book.

The ruling of the Tax

Commission is affirmed.
Counsel for the Tax Commission is reguested to prepare an
appropriate Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision and
submit the same to the court for review andi signature as provided
in the local rules of practice.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

certify

that

a true and correct

copy of the

foregoing Memorandum Decision was mailed postage prepaid to the
following attorneys on the

/^5

day of M^y, 1987.

Steven D. Woodland
R. Stephen Marshall
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400
Mary Beth Walz
Assistant Attorney General
Tax and Business Regulation Division
13 6 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Donald R. Bosch, Director
Auditing Division
State Tax Commission
P.O. Box 4000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134

Fl.

J IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Sai; Lei.e County Utah

,

MAY 121387

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR£ D|>onn^;e^iert. 3rd Dist. Court
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF TRTAU ' 'f|'' 5 *r'^ilKUM«K "
i

MARK 0. HAROLDSON,
dba MARKO ENTERPRISES,
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CIVIL NO-

C85-3384

«

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant.
Before the court are reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment
wherein this court is asked to review a decision of the Utah
State Tax Commission regarding the assessment of "use taxes."
The matter

came before

argument of the issues.
parties

submitted

positions.

the

court

on a special

setting

for

Prior to the hearihg on the matter, both

Memoranda

in

support

of

their

respective

The court has also received the! complete record from

the Utah State Tax Commission which has b^en marked as Court's
Exhibit One and made a part of the courtfs Official file.

After

hearing argument of counsel, the court took the matter under
advisement

to

further consider the authorities

cited by the

respective parties and to further examine the record from the
Utah State Tax Commission.
not in dispute.
this

matter

The material facts in this case are

The court has now had an opportunity to consider

and

being

otherwise

fully

Advised,

enters

the

following Memorandum Decision.
The plaintiff has appealed from a decision of the Utah State
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Tax Commission which assessed use taxes against the value of
mailing lists used in the course of his business.

The issue to

be resolved is whether the sales of these lists, in the form of
printed sheets and computer tapes, are subject to sales and use
taxes as tangible personal property.

The plaintiff argues that

the transactions involved the sale of services, and that any
transfer of tangible personal property was incidental to the sale
of intangible property.
that

any

services

The Tax Commission takes the position

provided

tangible personal property.

were

incidental

to

the

sale of

It is the opinion of the court that

these lists are tangible personal property, and that their sale
or use is subject to taxation.
Both

parties

have

moved

for

summary

judgment,

undisputed facts, briefly stated, are as follows.

and

the

The plaintiff

is a Utah corporation engaged in the marketing of real estate
information.

As a marketing technique, the plaintiff purchases

mailing lists from mailing list brokers to use in direct mail
advertising.

These lists are generated by the brokers based on

the target market specified by the plaintiff.

Such factors as

age, sex, income level, family status, and investment history are
used

to

define

those

plaintifffs advertising.

individuals

selected

to

receive

the

The completed lists are delivered to

the plaintiff for a one-time usage,1 and they are contained in
x

Mailing lists are commonly ••salted" with names of employees
of the broker to detect unauthorized use of the list.
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the printed sheets are

converted into mailing labels by a machine that cuts the names
from the sheet and gums them, and the computer tapes are read by
word processing equipment that prints the labels.

Approximately

thirty-five percent of the lists purchased by the plaintiff were
on computer tape, and sixty-five percent were on printed sheets.
Of the $154,844.10 paid by the plaintiff for these lists, the Tax
Commission

assessed

interest and penalty.

a use tax deficiency of $19,711.21, plus
The plaintiff has paid about $15,000, and

approximately $7,750 remains in dispute.
This inquiry focuses on the language of the Use Tax Act of
1937, Utah Code Ann.

§ 59-16-1, et seq. (1953).

The scope of

the use tax is defined in § 59-16-3(a) (Supp. 1986), which states
that an excise tax shall be levied upon the "storage, use, or
other consumption of tangible personal property . . .." Tangible
personal property is defined in the Utah Skies and Tax Book of
Regulations as "all tangible or corporeal things . . . capable of
i

being possessed or exchanged."

Tax Reg. A12-02-S26.

this definition provides little assistance/

Although

it is clear that

tangible personal property does not include such intangibles as
services.
The line of demarcation between tangible and intangible
property

is

not

always

clear.

Courts

grappling

with this

question have examined the "real object" sought by the buyer to
determine whether the buyer's object was to,obtain an act by an
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individual chosen for his skill, or whether it was the buyer's
object to obtain a product not dependent on the skills of the
individual providing it.

Accountant's Computer Serv. v. Kovsdar,

298 N.E.2d 519, 527, 35 Ohio St.2d 120 (1973).

If the true

object of the contract is the service per se, the transaction is
not subject to tax even though some tangible personal property is
transferred incidental to the transaction.
The problem is that many transactions involve an inseparable
combination

of

services

and

tangible

personal

property.

Accountantf s involved three cases that were disposed of in the
following manner:
1.

A data processing firm was supplied by the taxpayer

with raw data.

The firm transcribed in onto punch cards, and the

cards were sorted, classified and arranged.

The cards were then

delivered to the taxpayer.

This transaction was found to be a

taxable

accompanied

sale of a product

personal service.
2.

by

an

inconsequential

Id. at 527-28.

The additional service of data analysis transformed the

transaction to a nontaxable service transaction.

The delivery of

printed matter in the form of a report was determined to be the
inconsequential element of the transaction.
3.

Id. at 528.

A market research company compiled statistical data and

analyzed it for presentation to clients.

Again the court found a

service transaction that was exempt from taxation, stating "it
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was the intellectual and manual personal efforts . . . that was
sought . . . not the inconsequential tangible personal property
which was transferred,

for purposes of Communication,

incidental element without a separate chargel.11
Other

jurisdictions,

including

Utah,

reasoning in different factual contexts.

as an

Id. at 520.

have

applied

this

Tfoorne and Wilson, Inc.

v. Utah State Tax Commission, 681 P.2d 1237, 1238 (Utah 1984)
(ffit is the substance of the transaction land not the property
actually transferred that controls.M);
State Tax Commission, 716 P2. 1318

Old West Realty v. Idaho
(Idaho 1986) (transfer of

multiple listing books from listing service to real estate broker
was a taxable transaction) .

In the present case it seems clear

that the generation of the lists for the taxpayer involved little
expertise, marketing skill or analysis on thte part of the broker.
Although the plaintiff did consult the mailing list broker to a
limited extent, the purpose was to define the parameters of the
desired list, and this was done primarily b^r the plaintiff.

The

court finds that this service was incidental to the generation of
the lists, which were the real object of the transaction.

There

still remains the question of whether thes£ sales involved the
transfer of tangible or intangible personal property.
Regarding the printed sheets, it is clear that a sale of
tangible

personal

property

has

occurred.

These

lists were

processed by a machine that converted them to gummed labels, and
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they were affixed to the taxpayerfs mailings.
the use of these lists was proper.

The tax imposed on

Finaerhut Products Co. v.

Commissioner of Revenue. 258 N.W.2d 606

(Minn. 1977) sale of

mailing lists in the form of gummed labels constituted taxable
sale of tangible personal property) ; Matter of Alan Drev Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 67 A.D.2d 1055, 413 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1979)
(same).
Turning
difficult

to

the

question

transfer

of

the

is presented.

computer

tapes

Courts have

a more

distinguished

gummed mailing labels from computer tapes in refusing to find
computer tapes tangible personal property.

Mertz v. State Tax

Commission. 89 A.D.2d 396, 456 N.Y.S.2d 501, 503 (1982)

("the

tapes . . . were merely the medium by which the information that
was the essence of the transaction was transmitted."); Spencer
Gifts. Inc. v. Taxation Div. Director. 182 N.J. Super 179, 440
A. 2d

104,

information
property

117

(N.J.

Tax

1981)

("The

leasing

of

computer

is not the leasing or sale of tangible personal

and

is not taxable.");

Finaerhut

Products

Co. v.

Commissioner of Revenue. 258 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Minn. 1977) ("the
use of the tangible medium of typed mailing lists is merely
incidental to the use of the incorporeal information contained in
those lists.").
It is the opinion of this court that these prior cases have
made

a

distinction

Whether the

where

information

there

is no practical

is supplied

on gummed

difference.

labels, typed
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lists, or computer tape, an item of tangible personal property is
transferred,

and

the

transaction

is taxable.

Although

the

information contained by the tapes is incorporeal, it cannot be
possessed without some item of tangible pergonal property, and it
is of no value to the user until it it transformed
tangible

mailing

label.

It

is

not

simply

the

into a

intangible

information that the taxpayer seeks, but tl^e list in the form of
mailing labels.
information

it

The value of the media is determined by the
contains,

and

in

this

respect

the

sale

of

information on a computer tape is no different from the sale of
the same information contained in a book.

Jrhe ruling of the Tax

Commission is affirmed.
Counsel for the Tax Commission is requested to prepare an
appropriate Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision and
submit the same to the court for review and signature as provided
in the local rules of practice.

DATED this

/bQ day of May, 19a4.

IMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Depjty Cert-

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARK 0. HAROLDSEN,
dba MARKO ENTERPRISES,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DISPOSING OF
RECIPROCAL MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
AFFIRMING DECISION OF
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

Civil No. C85-3384
(talc case)
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendant.

POSTURE OF THE CASE
Reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment came on for hearing
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson on the 14th day of April,
1987.

R. Stephen Marshall and Steven D. Woodland appeared on

behalf of the plaintiff, Mark 0. Haroldsen, Ii(ic., Mary Beth Walz,
Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the defendant,
the Utah State Tax Commission.

Both parties submitted Memoranda

in support of their respective positions.

Pursuant to the

r*t\
OOOl.SC

stipulation of the parties, the complete record of the formal
hearing before the Utah State Tax Commission was placed before
the court in lieu of a trial.
received*

Exhibits were submitted and

Arguments of counsel were presented*
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiff is a Utah corporation engaged in the

marketing of real estate information.

As a marketing technique,

the plaintiff purchases mailing lists from mailing list brokers
for use in direct mail advertising.
2.

The lists are marketed by a brokerage agent who narrows

the raw lists according to a customer's specific requests in
order to
market.

create a list of names targeted towards a particular
Such factors as age, sex, income level, family status,

and investment history are used to define those individuals
selected to receive the customer's advertising.
3.

The lists consist of printed sheets or computer tapes

and are delivered to the plaintiff for a one-time usage.

The

printed sheets are converted into mailing labels by a machine
that cuts the names from the sheet and gums them, and the
computer tapes are read by word processing equipment that prints
the labels.

The plaintiff purchased approximately thirty-five

percent of the lists on computer tape and sixty-five percent on
printed sheets and paid a total of $154,844.10 for the use of
these lists.

-2-
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4.

The Tax Commission assessed a use tax deficiency of

$19#711.21, plus interest and penalty.

The plaintiff has paid

about $15,000.00 and approximately $7,750.00 remain in dispute.
ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW AND APPLICABLE UTAH STATUTES
1.

The Use Tax Act of 1937, Utah Code Anfi. §59-16-

3(a) (Supp. 1986) states that an excise tax shafLl be levied upon
the "storage, use, or other consumption of tangible personal
property..."
2.

Tangible personal property is defined in the Utah Sales

and Tax Book of Regulations as "all tangible or corporeal
things...capable of being possessed or exchanged."
02-S26.

Tax Reg. A12-

Tangible personal property does not include such

intangibles as services.
3.

Courts apply the "real object" test to determine whether

the buyer's object was to obtain an act by an individual chosen
for his skill, or whether the buyer sought a product not
dependent on the skills of the individual providing it.

Accountant's Computer Servt vt Kosyflarr 35 Ohio 2d 120, 298
N.E.2d 519, 527 (1973).

The Utah Supreme Court has also applied

this reasoning in a different factual context.

Thorne and

Wilson, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 681 P.2d 1237, 1238
(Utah 1984) ("[lit is the substance of the transaction and not
the property actually transferred that control^").

Old West

Realty v. Idaho State Tax Commission. 716 P.2d 1318 (Idaho 1986)

-3-

OOQ:J22

(holding that a transfer of multiple listing books from a listing
service to a real estate broker was a taxable transaction).
4.

In the present case, the generation of the lists

involved little expertise, marketing skill or analysis on the
part of the broker.

The function of defining the parameters of

the desired list was done primarily by the plaintiff.

The

service was incidental to the generation of the lists, which were
the real object of the transaction.
5.

The printed sheets constitute tangible personal

property.

Finaerhut Products Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 258

N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977).
6.

Although some courts distinguish printed sheets from

computer tapes by saying that the latter is nontangible, these
cases have made a distinction where there is no practical
difference.

The information contained by the computer tapes,

while incorporeal, is valueless until possessed in some tangible
form.

The value of the media is determined by the information it

contains, and in this respect, the sale of information on a
computer tape is no different from the sale of the same
information contained in a book.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The mailing lists in the form of printed sheets and in

the form of computer tapes are tangible personal property within
the meaning of Tax Reg A12-02-S26

-4-
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2.

The service provided by the broker was incidental to the

transaction to acquire the mailing lists.
3.

The mailing lists were the Mreal object" of the

transaction.
4.

The sale or use of the mailing lists is subject to

taxation as stated in U.C.A. §59-16-3(a)(Supp. 1986).
5.

The decision of the Utah Tax Commission is affirmed.
ORDER

1.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and

the final ruling of the Utah State Tax Commission is affirmed.
2.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

3.

The appealed use tax assessment in the amount of roughly

$7#750.00 and the accompanying interest imposed by the Utah State
Tax Commission against the plaintiff will become )?inal after the
period for appeal from this order has expired.
4.

This case is dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this

A ^ ^ d a y offletober,1987/

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
district Court Judge

A
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document to R. Stephen Marshall at 50 South
Main, Suite 1600, P.O. Box 45340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145,
postage pre-paid, this sr 3

day of October, 1987.
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Sr/fAf/cS

